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SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS HAVE BEEN
EFFECTIVELY USED IN CITIZEN SUITS TO DETER FUTURE
VIOLATIONS AS WELL AS TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT
ADDITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS
EDWARD LLOYD"

Supplemental Environmental Projects (SUPs) are environmentally benefical projects
included in settlements of environmentallaw enforcement cases. Courts have addressedSEPs
in two contexts: where proposedby partiesin consent decrees and where courts have fashioned
SEPs as apartof the relieforderedin an enforcement case. SEPs have been extensively used
in both government and citiZen enforcement cases despite the nearly universalabsence of any
explicit legislative authorization by Congress. Congress has tangentially recognized the place
ofSEPs in the penalty and deterrence scheme by giving the Administratorof the United States
Environmental ProtectionAgeny (EPA) and the Attorney General of the United States
oversight ofsettlements (which may include SEPs)proposedin Clean Water Act citizen suits
byproviding an opportuniyforcomment on proposedsettlements before thy are entered by the
federal district court. Congress has not enactedany statutory language to guide the inputfrom
the EPA or the DepartmentofJustice on settlements ingeneral or SEPs in particular. The
U.S. ComptrollerGeneralhas been the most criticalvoice regardingSEPs onfiscaland legal
grounds, determiningin 1993 thatfederalSEP settlements violated the MiscellaneousReceipts
Act (MRA). The SEP Poliy adopted by the EPA in 1998 addressedsuch concerns and
implemented measures to guide its use of SEPs in environmentalenforcement cases.
This Article first reviews the origins of the use of SEPs in environmental
enforcement cases. It next examines how courts have handled SEPs in two
contexts: (1) where proposed by parties in consent decrees and (2) where courts
have fashioned SEPs as a part of the relief ordered in environmental enforcement
cases. It then traces the Congressional response to the growing use of SEPs in
citizen suits throughout the 1980s and discusses the response to the use of SEPs
in citizen suits by the executive branch. This response culminated in the
adoption of a SEP Policy by the EPA in 1998. The Article next addresses the
EPA's reliance in settling enforcement cases on SEPs implemented by
defendants. The Article suggests that such reliance may reduce the penalty
impact of a SEP and thereby reduce the deterrent value of EPA's enforcement
action. The Article then reviews the tax treatment of SEPs by the courts and
EPA. Finally, the Article concludes with several case studies of creative and
successful SEPs used to settle citizen suits.
After reviewing the history of SEP usage by citizens under the CWA's citizen
suit provisions, this Article advances several conclusions. The use of citizen suit
SEPs is widespread and largely successful. Both the courts and Congress have
* Evan M. Frankel Clinical Professor of Environmental Law, Columbia School of Law. I
am extremely grateful to Janine Bauer, my colleague Susan Kraham of Rutgers Law School and to
my research assistants Nancy Christensen, Brent Bowker, Opal Bennett,Josh Plaut, Sarah Fowlkes,
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accepted, if not actively encouraged, SEPs either by affirmative approvals or
passive acceptance. Courts have generally approved SEPs in citizen suits, even
over the objections of EPA and the Department ofJustice. EPA has adopted
SEPs as a major component of its own enforcement regime. At the same time,
there is a sparse public record on the use of SEPs by EPA or citizens. To the
extent that the public record has been compiled, citizen suit SEPs have been
creative and successful, and they have been primarily implemented by entities that
were not involved in the enforcement litigation (i.e., "third parties"-neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant in the enforcement case). Since SEPs in citizen suits
have been undertaken more often by third parties rather than by defendants (as
is the usual practice in government enforcement cases), citizen suit SEPs have
avoided many of the drawbacks inherent in the implementation of SEPs by
defendants. Attorneys bringing citizen suits can and should continue to use large
and creative third party SEPs to maximize the environmental benefits of citizen
enforcement without sacrificing the significant deterrent value of these lawsuits.
1. INTRODUCTION: SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS IN CITIZEN
SUIT's

This Article addresses the use of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs)
in settlement of environmental enforcement actions brought by citizen plaintiffs.
SEPs are environmentally beneficial projects included in settlements of
environmental enforcement cases. SEPs are generally related to the violations
that led to the enforcement action or to the natural resource affected by those
violations. SEPs are often projects that mitigate some of the harm that has
resulted from these violations or restore a portion of the ecosystem affected by
the violations. SEPs also offset, or are an alternative to, a portion of the civil
monetary penalty that would otherwise be paid to the state or federal treasury in
the absence of the SEP. In this regard, SEPs also have some attributes of a
penalty. SEPs span a broad variety of projects ranging from pollution reduction
or prevention projects carried out by the defendant in the enforcement case, to
environmental projects (such as wetlands restoration or the purchase of open
space) implemented by third parties (often environmental or community groups)
located where the violation occurred. From time to time EPA has compiled a
database containing details on some of the SEPs it has approved in partial
settlement of its enforcement cases.' There is no current compilation of SEPs
used in either government enforcement cases or in citizen suits.

1. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMI'LIANCE
ASsURANCE, FY 1996 ENFORCEMENTAND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT

(1997); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT& COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, FY
1995 ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT (1996).
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Use of SEPs began in the early 1980s.2 SEPs are now well-accepted by all
three branches of the federal government and many state governments.' SEPs
were first used in environmental enforcement actions brought by the
government.'
Today, they are widely used to settle citizen enforcement
lawsuits-particularly those citizen suits brought under the federal Clean Water
Act (CWA).' In contrast to the fairly substantial literature regarding government
use of SEPs, there has been comparatively little literature discussing the use of
SEPs in the settlement of enforcement cases brought by citizens. 6 Moreover,
there is no comprehensive database on the use of SEPs by citizen plaintiffs.7
This Article examines the scope of SEP usage (both historic and potential) by
citizen litigants in environmental enforcement cases. In the absence of
comprehensive data, the Article relies perforce on the author's informal survey
of SEP usage and on previously published case studies.
2. THE ORIGINS OF THE USE OF

SEPs

IN ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

CASES

The earliest written reference to the use of SEPs generally is in EPA's 1980
Penalty Policy.' The EPA 1980 Penalty Policy states:
2. See EPA Civil Penalty Policy for Major Source Violators of the Clean Air Act and (lean
Water Act, [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:1101 ( uly 8,1980) [hereinafter 1980 EPA Penalty
Policy]; David S. Mann, Comment, Polluter-FinancedEnvironmentaly
BenefidalExpenditures:Effective Use
or Ioperbuseof Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act?, 21 ENvTL. L. 175, 191 (1991). See also
infra text accompanying notes 8-11.
3. See infra Parts 3-5.
4. Mann, supra note 2, at 191 n.94.
5. See, e.g., LISA JORGENSON & JEFFREY J. KIMMEL, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS:
CONFRONTING THE CORPORATION (a BNA Special Report), 19 (1988).
6. The articles written on the use of SEPs in consent decrees stemming from citizen suits
include: Mann, supranote 2 (providing history of citizen suits and consent decrees under the Clean
Water Act); Quan B. Nghiem, Comment, Using Equitable Discretion To Impose Spplemental
Environmental Projects Under the Ckan Water Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 561, 593 (1997)
(arguing that until Congress recognizes that "ordering cessation of violations and payment of civil
penalties is insufficient by itself," courts should rely on their equitable jurisdiction power, as
discussed in WIeinbeiger v. Romero-Barelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982)); Michael Paul Stevens, Note &
Comment, Limits on SupplementalEnironmentalProjectsin ConsentAgreements To Settle Clean WaterAct
Citizen Suits, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 757 (1994) (discussing chronology of cases leading up to and
immediately after Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic ControlsDesign, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990) and
amendments to the Clean Water Act).
7. The United States Department of Justice has, however, reported an aggregate value of
more than $10 million for citizen suit SEPs under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act for
the years 1999-2001. U.S. DOJ,Justice, Policy, Legislation and Special Litigation Section, Annual
Environmental Citizen Suit Report (2002). See also James R. May, Non, More Than Ever Trends in
EnironmentalCitizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 28 tbl.8 (2003).
8. 1980 EPA Penalty Policy, supra note 2. See also Mann, supra note 2, at 191.
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Occasions have arisen in enforcement actions where violators have offered to make
expenditures for environmentally beneficial purposes above and beyond
expenditures made to comply with all existing legal requirements, in lieu of paying
penalties to the treasury of the enforcing government. Courts have sometimes
accepted such payments, and in some circumstances such arrangements are
acceptable under this penalty policy.9
Before it published its 1980 Penalty Policy, the EPA had a history of using SEPs
in the settlement of its enforcement actions."' For instance, in settling a case in
1980, EPA agreed to allow the defendant to pay $2,165,000 to the Los Angeles
Environmental Trust for environmentally beneficial projects."
Citizen suits under the Clean Water Act (CWA) increased markedly in 1983
and afterward. In that year, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
launched a project to bring citizen suits under the Clean Water Act,' 2 and New
Jersey Public Interest Research Group (NJPIRG) initiated fifteen lawsuits under
the Act.'" By 1988, the Bureau of National Affairs found that more than 880
citizen suit cases had been filed nationally under the Act.' 4 The growth in citizen
suits led inexorably to a growth in SEPs and, in particular, third-party SEPs.
3. JUDI(CIAL REVIEW OF SEPs
SEPs reach the courts as provisions in consent decrees submitted to the court
for approval and entry of the decree. The United States Supreme Court has held
that the trial court must determine whether the consent decree is "further[ing] the
objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based" when considering
whether to enter a consent decree." The Supreme Court has also held that a
federal court is not necessarily "barred from entering a consent decree merely
because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded
after a trial."' 6 Thus, both the parties to a lawsuit and the courts have broader
discretion to fashion appropriate relief in the negotiation and entry of a consent

9. 1980 EPA Penalty Policy, supra note 2, at 1106.
10. Mann, supra note 2, at 191 n.94.
11. United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-773047-HP (C.D. Cal. 1980); Mann, supra
note 2, at n.93.
12. Mann, supra note 2, at 182-83.
13. The author was the Executive Director of New Jersey Public Interest Research Group
(NJPIRG) at that time and participated in authorizing the lawsuits on behalf of NJPIR(;.
14. See JORGENSON & KIMMEL, supra note 5, for a comprehensive review of the early use
of citizen suits.
15. Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City ofCleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 525 (1986) (holding that section 7 0 6 (g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not
preclude the entry of a consent decree that would provide relief potentially benefiting individuals
who were not actual victims of the defendant's discriminatory practices).
16. Id.
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decree than they have in a determination on the merits of the complaint in an
adjudication by the court.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate
court to make a determination regarding the validity of SEPs.
In a typical
citizen suit under section 505 of the Clean Water Act, the Sierra Club had filed
suit against a defendant Electronic Controls Design, Inc., for discharging
pollutants into waters of the United States in violation of its discharge permit."8
As part of a proposed settlement reached by the parties, the defendant agreed
interaliato pay $45,000 to private environmental organizations "for their efforts
to maintain and protect water quality in Oregon" and to pay additional money to
these organizations if it violated its permit within a ten month period.' The
district court had refused to enter the decree containing the $45,000 payment.
The appellate court overturned the district court's refusal to enter the decree.
It ruled the payments provided for in the SEP were not "civil penalties" under
the Clean Water Act, because "[n]o violation of the Act was found or determined
by the proposed settlement judgment."'21 The appellate court noted that on two
occasions the Supreme Court had stated that "civil penalties imposed by a court
in a citizens' suit under the Clean Water Act must be made payable to the U.S.
treasury." 2' The government had argued and the district court had found that
"[t]he Clean Water Act authorizes the imposition of civil penalties only if paid to
the federal treasury."22 The reviewing court, however, distinguished between civil
penalties resulting from findings of Clean Water Act violations and "payments"
established in consent decrees, thus rejecting the argument of the federal
government and the decision of the district court "that the proposed judgment
was illegal because it contained no requirement that [the defendant] make
payments to the U.S. treasury." 23 The appellate court also recognized that while
Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987 "to give the government more
power to oversee and monitor the entry of consent judgments in citizens' suits,"
it "did not take this opportunity to comment on the type of relief permitted in

17. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000). See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 703 F. Supp.
875,876 (D. Or. 1989), rev'd, 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990).
19. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1352.
20. Id.
at 1354.
21. Id. In Gwatney of Smithfield Ltd v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), the
Court held that "[i]f the citizen prevails in such an action, the court may order injunctive relief
and/or impose civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury." Id. at 53 (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (2000)). In Middlesex Couny Sewerage Authotio v. National Sea Cammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981), the Court held that "[uinder the IClean Water Act], civil penalties, payable to the
Government, also may be ordered by the court." Id at 14 n.25 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000)).
22. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1352.
23. Id.
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citizens' suit settlements and did not indicate that
the settlements must include
24
payment of civil penalties to the U.S. treasury."
Thus, the appellate court in Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc.,
distinguished "civil penalties" assessed after a judicial finding of liability under the
Clean Water Act from "payments" made to environmental organizations as part
of a consent decree when no liability had been established under the Act. Under
the court's decision, liability must be established for a payment to be considered
a "civil penalty," and if a payment is considered a civil penalty, then it must go to
the U.S. Treasury. Finally, the reviewing court found that the proposed consent
decree furthered the purpose of the Clean Water Act and did not violate its terms
or policy, and, therefore, "[tihe district court abused its discretion in failing to
enter the proposed consent judgment." 25
Shortly after this decision in the Ninth Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit addressed the use of SEPs in citizen suits. In PublicInterest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. (NJPIRG)v. Powell Duffln Terminals, Inc. (PD1)D, 21 the
appellate court addressed the question of whether a district judge, after a trial on
the merits, could create a SEP as a part of the judicially imposed remedy. This
appellate court held that once the trial court "labeled the money as civil penalties
it could only be paid into the Treasury. 2' The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit also found that requiring civil penalties to be paid to the Treasury "is
entirely consistent with Congress' intent that citizen suits supplement the
enforcement authority of the EPA" and that such a requirement "ensures that
citizens bring suits to protect the public health and welfare, and not for private
gain. The NJPIRG holding in the Third Circuit is consistent with the Electronic
Controls Design ruling in the Ninth Circuit because both courts held that once a
payment is labeled a civil penalty, it must be paid to the treasury. In reviewing
the SEP created by the trial court in the NJPIRG case, however, the appellate
court permitted the EPA, which had not been a party to the case below, to
intervene to contest the creation of the environmental benefit fund by the trial
court. Citing the legislative history of the Clean Water Act, the court agreed with
EPA's rationale and concluded that "Congress intended that any penalties
assessed in a citizen suit be treated as 'miscellaneous receipts."'2 - The court
concluded that under the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, "any person having
24. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1356. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1356(c)(3) (2000).
25. SierraClub, 909 F.2d at 1356.
26. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir.19 90).
27. Id at 82.
28. Id (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 18
n.27 (1981)).
29. Id.at 81 (citing S. REP. No. 92-414 (1971), repittedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745)
("[A]ny penalties imposed would be deposited as miscellaneous receipts and not be recovered by
the complainant.").
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custody of such public funds must deposit them in the Treasury within three days
of receipt.""" The court also cited a litany of cases supporting its conclusion that
civil penalties under the Clean Water Act must be paid to the Treasury.
Other courts have followed the Third Circuit's conclusion, not only in the
context of citizen suits, but also when the plaintiff is the United States. The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held in United States v. Roll
Coater,Inc. that once an assessment is labeled as a civil penalty, the money must
be paid to the Treasury."2 In United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that the Clean Water Act was
silent on where civil penalties were to be deposited, and, therefore, courts were
required to follow the Miscellaneous Receipts Act and deposit penalties into the
Treasury. 3
Deference to the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, while correct on its face, and
reliance on the "label" (civil penalty vs. benefit project) given to the payment,
have obscured, to some extent, the purpose and benefit of SEPs. On the surface,
the NJPIRG court's holding that a civil penalty must be paid to the Treasury
narrowed the disposition of penalties assessed after trial and finding of liability.
In dictum, however, the appellate court provided useful guidance to litigants and
trial courts regarding precisely how a SEP payment may survive a challenge even
if the SEP is created after a trial on the merits. The appellate court agreed with
plaintiff NJPIRG that "in a Clean Water Act case, a court may fashion injunctive
relief requiring a defendant to pay monies into a remedial fund, if there is a nexus
between the harm and the remedy."' If a trial court, in granting relief in a citizen
suit, does not label payments to be made as civil penalties but instead fashions an
equitable remedy in the form of an environmental benefit fund, SEPs may be
created as part of final judgments in citizen suits. Under the NJPIRG court's
30. Powell Duffln, 913 F.2d at 81 (citing 31 U.S.C. S 3302(c)(1)) (2000).
31. ld at 82 (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49,53 (1987) ("If the citizen prevails in such an action, the court may order injunctive relief and/or
impose civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury."); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. Nat'i Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 n.25 (1981) ("Under the I-WPCA, civil penalties,
payable to the Government, also may be ordered by the court."); Ad. States Legal Found. v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128,1131 n.5 (11 th Cir.1990) ("Penalties paid as a result of a § 1365 suit do
not go to the plaintiff who instituted the suit, but rather are paid into the United States Treasury.");
Sierra Club v.Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109,1113 (4th Cir.1 988) CIlhe judicial relief of civil
penalties, even if payable only to the United States Department of the Treasury, is causally
connected to a citizen-plaintiff's injury."), cert.denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989); Sierra Club v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1522 (9th Cir.1987) ("[A]ny penalties recovered from such an action
are paid into the United States Treasury."); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d
1350 (9th Cir.1990)).
32. No. IP 89-828C, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8790, at *30 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 1991).
33. 982 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Va. 1997), reW'd and remanded on otherground, 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. deniet4 531 U.S. 813 (2000).
34. Powell Dufflyn, 913 F.2d at 82.
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dictum, the payment would not implicate the Miscellaneous Receipts Act where
the payment is created as part of equitable relief and not a civil penalty even
where liability has been determined.
If the equitable approach were followed by trial courts, the potential use of
SEPs could expand beyond merely consent decrees and settlement documents
to the creation of SEPs by court order after full trial on the merits as part of
injunctive relief. Even if trial courts do not adopt this approach in fashioning
remedies after a trial on the merits, the NJPIRG court's guidance, albeit dictum,
provides useful advice to litigants who are crafting consent decrees to setde
citizen suits. Payments for environmentally beneficial projects, or SEPs, can be
included as a part of the ordinary injunctive relief in the case and not as a
payment in lieu of civil penalties that otherwise would be paid to the Treasury.
Consent decrees using this equitable relief model may avoid the formalistic label
trap and subsequent challenge by the government or rejection by a trial court.
Proponents of such "equitable" SEPs may still face the argument that the
amount to be paid is too small for the violations involved; but that is a different
and more difficult argument for either the government or the court to make
when faced with parties who seek to settle litigation on terms that otherwise are
consonant with the underlying statute. Upon remand to the district court, the
litigants in the NJPIRG case heeded the appellate court's guidance and created
an environmental benefit fund called the Environmental Endowment of New
Jersey (EENJ). The Endowment continues to function3as
a private grant-making
s
entity for SEPs addressing the affected body of water.
Just as all SEPs are not created equal, neither are all civil penalties. A case in
point is Northwest EnvironmentalDefense Center v. Unified Sewerage Ageny.3" There,
the District Court for the District of Oregon ruled that the defendant's
agreement to pay $1 million to the state of Oregon to fund additional staff
positions and for an endowment fund "to restore, enhance, and maintain the
waters of the Tualatin River""' was, in fact, a penalty under the Clean Water Act.
In that case, individuals, citizens' groups, and the Unified Sewerage Agency of
Washington County reached a settlement over alleged violations of the Clean
Water Act and submitted a donsent decree to the court. The proposed consent
decree required (1) compliance with the Clean Water Act, which the parties
estimated would necessitate approximately $50 million in capital investments, and
(2) the payment of an additional $1 million by the defendant. Of the $1 million,
$100,000 was to be paid to the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
for additional staffpositions to enforce compliance with the decree, and $900,000
for an endowment fund to be "created to restore, enhance, and maintain the

35. See infra at Part 8.2 for a more complete discussion of the EENJ.
36. C iv. No. 88-1128-HO, 1990 WL 191827 (D. Or. July 27, 1990).
37. Id. at*"1.
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waters of the Tualatin River basin and the 'state
of Oregon in ways which cannot
3
be mandated under the Clean Water Act. 9
The proposed consent decree was submitted to the EPA Administrator and
the Attorney General for comment pursuant to § 1365(c)(3) of the Clean Water
Act. The Department of Justice objected to the consent decree on the grounds
that there was "not a sufficient penalty aspect of the proposed consent decree
[the $1 million], as compared to its injunctive and rehabilitative aspects [the $50
million in investments]."3" The Department of Justice took the position that "a
penalty is not a penalty under the Clean Water Act unless it provides for the
direct payment of money to the Treasury," ' " an attempt to import the rationale
of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act into settlements under the Clean Water Act.
The district court rejected the government's approach, however, and found the
$1 million payment constituted a penalty, and a sufficient one. The court, noted
that "[n]one of [the] money will go to the plaintiffs or any organizations with
which they are involved" and that the fund would support "further enforcement
by the state of Oregon and improve water quality in the Tualatin River basin in
ways which could not be judicially mandated."'" The district court found that the
"purpose of the Clean Water Act is to improve water quality, not endow the
Treasury," 2 and noted that the proposed settlement furthered this purpose.
Thus, the district court not only gave its approval to the proposed SEP over the
objections of the federal government, but seemed to advocate the use of SEPs,
as long as the projects went beyond what was mandated by law and did not
merely benefit the plaintiffs.
In Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. United Sewerage Agengy, and other
cases, courts as well as litigants on both sides of the case have impliedly, or
explicitly, questioned the benefit of "endowing the Treasury." It is fair to say that
applying the letter or the rationale of Miscellaneous Receipts Act to
environmental enforcement cases has not proved successful.
Judicial support for the use of SEPs in citizen suits, both as provisions in
consent decrees proposed to settle these cases, and by courts in final judgments
so long as they are crafted as part of injunctive relief, is quite apparent. Indeed,
in some instances, a SEP created to settle in a citizen suit may totally displace the
payment of a civil penalty to the federal Treasury. The courts have generally
placed few meaningful restrictions upon the ability of parties to craft SEPs in
environmentally beneficial settlements. The restrictions suggest that 1) the
payment may not be labeled a penalty; 2) the payment must be of a sufficient
amount; 3) the payment must further the purpose of the Act being enforced, and
4) the payment may not solely benefit plaintiff.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

NortbwestEnvti Def Cr, 1990 WL 191827, at *1.
Id
d
Id
Id.
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The rather extensive use of SEPs prior to 1990 occurred despite the absence
of any statutory provision explicitly authorizing EPA, citizens, or courts to use
SEPs in the settlement or adjudication of enforcement cases.43 As discussed
below, when Congress turned its attention to the use of SEPs, it was generally
supportive of the practice.
With the growth of the use of citizen suits in the mid 1980s," the U.S.
Department ofJustice in 1985 began publicly to question the use of SEPs in lieu
of paying civil penalties to the Treasury.4" In 1985, concerns that citizen suits
were being filed and settled without the knowledge of or any input by the federal
government led the Reagan Administration to propose amendments to the Clean
Water Act that addressed the issue."6 Specifically, the proposed amendment to
section 505 required that "[njo consent judgment shall be entered in an action in
which the United States is not a party prior to forty-five days following the
receipt of a copy of the proposed consent judgment by the Attorney General and
the Administrator."' According to the Congressional Record, Senator John
Chafee (R-RI) stated in the floor debates on the amendment that the purpose of
the amendment was a concern with "protect[ing] the public from abusive,
collusive, or inadequate settlements."4 One of the purposes of the forty-five-day
review period was to allow the government "the opportunity to identify, to
challenge and to deter, as much as possible," problematic settlements.4" It is
important to note that the proposed statutory amendment was not limited to
review of consent decrees that included SEPs but was directed to all consent
decrees proposed to be entered to settle a citizen suit. Thus, the Congressional
concern was to monitor citizen suit settlements in general, but not based upon
any particular concern with SEPs. Despite this concern, the Conference Report
43. David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of EnvironmentalEnforcement Reform: The Case of
Suppkmental EnironmentalProjects,1998 WIS. L REV. 1181, 1183 (1998). When Congress enacted
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, it explicitly provided authority for a court to order that
up to $100,000 of a civil penalty be used for SEP. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (2000). See also infra
at notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
44. As noted, supra note 134 and accompanying text, by 1988, the Bureau of National Affairs
found that over 880 citizen suits had been filed nationally under the Act. See JORGENSON &
KIMMEL, supra note 5.
45. See, e.g., Justice - WlaterAct Citizen Suit Provison Constitulional... But What Then Happens to
CitilPenaltyMong'???,Envtl. F., Apr. 1985, at 43 (discussing concerns raised by the Department of
Justice in its amicus brief for Student Pubic InterestResearch Group, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., Civ. No. 832040 (D.N.J. 1985)). See also Mann, supra note 2, at 192 and n.100.
46. Mann, supra note 2, at 192.
47. 131 CONG. REC. S3640 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1985).
48. 131 CONG. REC. S8097 (daily ed. June 13, 1985) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
49. 131 CONG. REC. S3645 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1985).
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on the 1987 Amendments also endorsed the use of SEPs when discussing section
309 of the Clean Water Act:
In certain instances settlements of fines and penalties levied due to NPDES
permit and other violations have been used to fund research, development and
other related projects which further the goals of the Act. In these cases, the funds
collected in connection with these violations were used to investigate pollution
problems other than those leading to the violation. Settlements of this type
preserve the punitive nature of enforcement actions while putting the funds
collected to use on behalf of environmental protection. Although this practice has
been used on a selective basis, the conferees encourage this procedure where
appropriate." j
Thus, while Congress enacted a provision in the 1987 amendments to the
Clean Water Act to ensure EPA and the Department of Justice would have an
opportunity to comment to the district court regarding any settlements proposed
in citizen enforcement cases, Congress did not adopt any explicit statutory criteria
to guide EPA or the courts on the limits of acceptable SEPs. Moreover, as a
general matter, in the legislative history of the amendments, legislators
encouraged citizens to continue to include SEPs in settlements.
The only instance in which Congress has explicitly included language regarding
SEPs in an environmental statute is in the Clean Air Act. 1 Indeed, the Clean Air
Act is the only federal statute that expressly grants courts authority to order that
a portion of a civil penalty be used for "beneficial mitigation projects which are2
consistent with this chapter and enhance the public health or the environment.,1
This provision states:
the court in any action under this subsection.., shall have discretion to order that
such civil penalties, in lieu of being deposited in the fund... be used in beneficial
mitigation projects.... The court shall obtain the view of the Administrator in
exercising such discretion and selecting any such projects. The amount of any such
payment in any such action shall not exceed $10 0 ,0 00.
In 1990 when Congress added subsection g(2 ) to section 7604 (the citizen suit
provision) of the Clean Air Act, it also created a special fund into which all civil
penalties imposed by a court in a citizen suit shall be deposited. Section
76 04(g)(1) provides:
[plenalties received under subsection (a) [authorizing citizen suits] . . .shall be

deposited in a special fund in the United States Treasury for licensing and other
services. Amounts in such fund are authorized to be appropriated and shall remain
available until expended, for use by the Administrator to finance air compliance and
enforcement activities. The Administrator shall annually report to the Congress
50.
51.
52.
53.

H.R.CONF. REP.No. 1004, at 139 (1986) (discussing 33 U.S.C.§ 1319) (2000).
See 42 U.S.C. § 7604()(2) (2000).
Id.
Id
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about the sums deposited into the fund, the sources thereof, and the actual and
proposed uses thereof.s'
In enacting the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress addressed
two important issues that had arisen from the use of SEPs by both government
and citizens. First, it explicitly authorized the courts to direct a limited portion
of a civil penalty to a beneficial mitigation project (i.e., SEP) in a final judgment
in a citizen suit. This provision extended the use of SEPs beyond inclusion in a
settlement and explicitly authorized SEPs to be ordered by the court as a portion
of the civil penalty under the statute, albeit limited to $100,000. 5 5 The statute
remains silent on whether a SEP included in a settlement of a Clean Air Act suit
is so limited. However, the history and widespread use of SEPs and Congress'
awareness of their use suggests that no such limit extends to the use of SEPs in
settlements of the Clean Air Act cases.
One of the underlying concerns that has driven the use of SEPs is that dollars
paid in civil penalties might be of greater benefit to the environment if they were
directed toward environmentally-beneficial projects rather than paid into the
general fund of the Treasury. In enacting subsections (g)(1) and (g)(2), Congress
addressed litigants' and the courts' general skepticism that penalties deposited
into the federal treasury would be particularly well-utilized. It did so by creating
a separate, distinct fund within the federal budget to receive CAA penalties
assessed in citizen suits. The creation of the penalty fund by Congress in the
Clean Air Act addresses this skepticism by requiring that all civil penalties
assessed as the result of citizen suits be paid into an environmental fund to be
administered by EPA for air compliance and enforcement.5 6 It remains unclear
whether citizen plaintiffs or defendants will be less interested in using SEPs in
consent decrees because civil penalties paid to the government under the Clean
Air Act will be deposited in an environmental fund. Citizen plaintiffs may prefer
to direct funds to locally-beneficial environmental projects rather than to a
national EPA enforcement fund. Likewise, defendants may prefer to garner
goodwill and good public relations from implementing local mitigation and
restoration projects. Defendants may also be reluctant to enhance EPA's
financial capacity to foster compliance and enforcement.
In summary, Congress in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments explicitly
addressed the use of SEPs and, in doing so, permitted their limited use in judicial
decrees. It directed that all such penalties from citizen suits be used by EPA for
compliance and enforcement. Perhaps most importantly, Congress placed no
overt barriers on the use of SEPs by citizens in the settlement of their
enforcement actions.

54. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(1) (2000).
55. Id. 7604(g)(2).
56. Id. 7604(g)(1).
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While Congress has not enacted any other explicit SEP provisions, in 1993 a
bill was introduced to amend the Clean Water Act to authorize SEPs in much the
same manner that projects have been authorized in the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act. 7 In June 1993, Senators Max Baucus (D-MT) and John Chafee
(R-RI) introduced a Clean Water Act reauthorization bill, which provided that
district courts would be allowed to allocate all or part of a civil penalty to a SEP."8
The bill would permit a payment to "be used for a beneficial project to enhance
public health or the environment by restoring or otherwise improving, in a
manner consistent with [the CWA], the water quality, wildlife or habitat of the
waterbody in which the violation occurred." 5' The proposed bill would have
authorized a court to order a defendant to restore the natural resources damaged
or destroyed as the result of the violation at issuef' According to the bill's
scheme, "[t]he maximum cost of any restoration . . . [could] not exceed the
maximum amount of a civil penalty [under the CWA]."'
In 1994, the Clinton Administration recommended that the CWA be amended
to clarify that "in addition to the payment of a cash penalty that recovers at
minimum the economic benefit of the violation, a federal court may
authorize-as part of a consent decree or settlement in an EPA civil judicial
action or citizen suit-that the violator complete a SEP to improve the
environment or public health."' Congress, however, enacted neither the BaucusChafee amendments nor the Clinton Administration recommendations.
Congress has not amended the Clean Water Act since 1987.
To summarize, Congress has provided for oversight and input by EPA and the
Department ofJustice into the settlement of citizen suits under the Clean Water
Act, but has not enacted any explicit statutory criteria to guide either the
executive agencies or the courts in carrying out that review. Congress has also
explicitly authorized courts to allocate a portion of civil penalties to SEPs in the
Clean Air Act and provided that all Clean Air Act civil penalties shall be paid into
an EPA fund for compliance and enforcement. Significantly, despite questions
from the Department ofJustice, it has imposed no limitations on the use of SEPs
by citizens and defendants in the settlement ofenvironmental enforcement cases.
Congress has instead left the development of criteria for the use of SEPs to the
courts. In light of the extensive use of SEPs by litigants and the courts, and the
awareness of Congress of these activities, it is fair to conclude that Congress has
accepted their use.
57. A BillTo Amend andReauthoriethe FederalWaterPollution ControlAct, andforOtherPurposes:
Heatingon S. 1114 Before the Subcomm. on Ckan WaterFisberies,and Wildfe of the Comm. on Env't &l Pub.
Works, 103d Cong. (1993); Stevens, supra note 6, at 784.
58. S.1114, 103d Cong. 262 (1993); 139 CONG. REC. S7216-03 (daily ed. June 15, 1993).
59. S.1114, 103d Cong. 262 (1993).

60. Id.
61. Id. at 264.
62. President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative, EPA 800-R-94-001 at 101 (Feb. 1994).
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4.1 The Comptroller General'sResponse to the Use qf SEPs By EPA.
The United States Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting
Office and is an agent of Congress." The Comptroller General has the authority
to study the programs and expenditures of the federal government and to make
recommendations to Congress and heads of executive agencies on more efficient
ways to spend taxpayers' money. " The Comptroller General has the authority
to "settle all accounts of the United States Government" and to issue opinions
and legal interpretations on appropriations matters.6 s
Because the Comptroller General is an agent of Congress, the Supreme Court
held that it could not constitutionally perform the executive functions delegated
to it under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
because such an action would result in impermissible Congressional control of
an executive decision. ' In light of that decision, there is some debate as to the
binding effect of the Comptroller General's opinions on executive agencies, as
well as the constitutionality of some of the Comptroller General's duties.67
Irrespective of the uncertainty surrounding the extent of its authority with
respect to executive agencies, the Comptroller General has been the most serious
critic of the use of SEPs in setdement of administrative enforcement cases
brought by the government. In unpublished opinions in 1992 and again in 1993,
the Comptroller General opined that certain EPA settlements under the Clean
Air Act exceeded its statutory authority."8 The Comptroller General based its
view on strict construction of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act (MRA), the federal
law that requires all federal agencies to remit all penalties to the United States
Treasury. ' The Comptroller General's view was that compromising civil

63. SeeThe Reorganization Act of 1945, . 7,79 Pub. L. No. 263 (1945); The Reorganization
Act of 1949, § 7,81 Pub. L. No. 109 (1949); The Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, . 111,81
Pub. L. No. 784 (1950).
64. The Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, . 111, 81 Pub. L. No. 784 (1950).
65. 31 U.S.C. § 3526 (2000); Edward I. Murray, Note, B!yond Bowsher: The Comptroller
General's Account Settlement Authoriy and Separationof Powers, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 165-66
(1999).
66. See general Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
67. See Kevin T. Abikoff, Note, The Role of the ComptrollrGeneralinLight ofBowsher v. Synar,
87 COLUM. L. REv. 1539 (1987); L. Harold Levinson, Symiposium: Bowsher v. Synar: BalancingActs:
Bowsher v. Synar, Gramm-Rudman-Holkngs,andBgVond, 72 CORNELLL REv. 527 (1987); Murray, supra
note 65.
68. See Opinion of Comptroller General of the United States, GAO No. B-247155, available
at 1992 WL 726317 (july 7, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 GAO Opinion]; Opinion of Comptroller
General of the United States, GAO No. B-247155.2, availableat 1993 WL 798227 (Mar. 1, 1993)
[hereinafter 1993 GAO Opinion]. See also Dana, supra note 43, at 1183.

69. See 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2000).
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to third parties amounted to an illegal diversion
penalties in favor of payments
70
of funds from the Treasury.
In the 1992 decision, the Comptroller General held that EPA lacked authority
to settle mobile source air pollution enforcement actions brought pursuant to
section 205 of the Clean Air Act, as amended in 1990,7' by entering into
settlement agreements that allow alleged violators to fund public awareness and
other projects relating to automobile air pollution in exchange for reductions of
the civil penalties assessed against them." The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 amended section 205 to establish new maximum penalties for a number of
the mobile source violations of the Act.7" The amendments also "established
authority for the administrative assessment of certain civil penalties . .. by an
order made on the record after an opportunity for a hearing ... [and] . . . set
forth various factors for EPA to consider in assessing these civil penalties."74 In
addition, the amendments gave EPA "power to 'compromise, or remit, with or
without conditions"' any administrative penalty that could be imposed under
section 205." s EPA had argued to the Comptroller General that its power to
"compromise, or remit, with or without conditions," civil penalties assessed
under amended section 205 of the Clean Air Act provided it with a sufficient
legal basis for its practice of mitigating penalties in exchange for a violator's
funding public awareness projects. EPA also attempted "to justify its alternative
payment policy on the ground that the funded projects further the goals
expressed by Congress in sections 101 through 104 of the Clean Air Act."7 "
The Comptroller General rejected both of EPA's arguments. It relied on two
of its earlier decisions 77 to reject the proposition that EPA could use its power
to "compromise, or remit, with or without conditions" to reduce civil penalties
in lieu of the violator funding public awareness projects. The Comptroller
General had held in 1990 that section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, which gave the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) "the power to
impose civil monetary penalties, not to exceed $100,000, and to 'compromise,
mitigate, or remit' such penalties ' ' 7 empowered the NRC "to adjust penalties to
reflect the special circumstances of the violation or concessions exacted from the
violator, but that its authority did not extend to remedies unrelated to the

70. 1992 GAO Opinion, rupra note 68, at 5 n.2.

71. 42 U.S.C. § 7524 (2000).
72. 1992 GAO Opinion, rspra note 68, at 2.
73. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 101 -549, 104 Stat. 2399; Section 228(c), 104 Stat. at 2508).
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id. at 2-3.
77. 70 Comp. Gen. 17, available at 1997 WL 293769 (Oct. 9, 1990); Opinion of the
Comptroller General of the United States, GAO No. B-210210, availabl at 1983 WL 197623 (Sept.
14, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 GAO Opinion].
78. 1992 GAO) Opinion, supra note 68, at 3 (citing 70 Comp. Gen. 17 (Oct. 9, 1990)).
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correction of the violation in question." 79 In addition, the Comptroller General
found that such a practice would allow the NRC to circumvent section 3302(b)
of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, which "requires agencies to deposit money
received from any source into the Treasury." Similarly, in a 1983 Commodities
Future Trading Commission (CFTC) decision, the Comptroller General rejected
the CFTC's contention that under its prosecutorial power provided by the
Commodities Exchange Act, the CFTC could accept a charged party's promise
to make a donation to an educational institution as all or part of the settlement
of a case."' The Comptroller General concluded that it saw "no basis for
concluding that EPA's prosecutorial authority under section 205 of the Clean Air
Act is any more expansive than that of the NRC or the CFTC."' 2
In the 1993 decision, the Comptroller General further elaborated on its
position regarding the EPA's arguments regarding its SEP policy."1 The
Comptroller General noted that while the SEP policy typically requires a "nexus"
between the violation and the environmental benefits derived from the
supplemental projects, the policy does not require a nexus for "public awareness"
projects.'M Consequently, the Comptroller General concluded that such projects
go beyond the correction of the violation at issue, and therefore are not
sanctioneds by EPA's discretionary authority to compromise or remit civil
penalties'
Lastly, upon reviewing a report on the Senate's version of the Clean Air Act
Amendments, which EPA had argued demonstrated that Congress had ratified
EPA's alternative penalty policy, the Comptroller General concluded that EPA
did not cite any purported evidence of congressional knowledge or acquiescence
in the terms of its alternative settlements. 6 Taking a more restrictive approach,
the Comptroller General noted that "Congress's addition in 1990 of a new
subsection to the section of the Clean Air Act governing citizen suits
demonstrates that had Congress intended to authorize the EPA to fund special
projects with civil penalties assessed pursuant to section 205, it could have said
so in much clearer terms.""7 As noted earlier, the new citizen suit subsection
304(g)(1) provides that penalties assessed in citizen suits shall be deposited in a
special fund in the United States Treasury for use by the EPA Administrator to
finance "air compliance and enforcement activities" and requires the
Administrator annually to report to Congress about the sums deposited into the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

1992 GAO Opinion, smfpra note 68, at 3.
Id.
(citing 31 U.S.C. 3302(b) (2000)).
Id at 4 (citing 7 U.S.C... 9, 13b (1976); 1983 GAO Opinion).
Id
1993 GAO Opinion, supranote 68.
Id at *1.
Id.
1992 GAO Opinion at 5-6 (citing S. REP. No. 228, at 125-26 (1989)).
Id at 5 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(1) (2000)).
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fund, the sources of the fund, and the actual and proposed uses of the fund."
The Comptroller General noted that
the specific language authorizing the funding of EPA air compliance and
enforcement activities through penalties received by way of citizen suits stands in
stark contrast to the language drafted by the same Congress in section 205, which
merely states that EPA may 'compromise, or remit, with or without conditions'
administrative penalties imposed. 9
The Comptroller General's rulings regarding the ability of EPA to
compromise civil penalty payments in favor of funding other projects are based
upon two grounds: first, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act (MRA) prohibition of
the diversion of funds from the federal treasury and the related limitations on an
agency's ability to circumvent the appropriation power of Congress and second,
the concern that there must be a close nexus between the purpose of the
alternative payment and remedying the alleged violation. The MRA-related
concerns are focused on the allocation of powers within the federal government
and may not impose significant limitations, if any, on settlements of citizen suits.
As discussed above, courts have broad powers to fashion (and/or approve
settlements that include) equitable relief and to describe payments as something
other than civil penalties. In contrast, EPA equitable powers under the Clean Air
Act are not as expansive as those of the judicial branch at least in the view of the
Comptroller General.
The Comptroller General's view regarding the nexus between the payments
made and the violations is that EPA's "authority did not extend to remedies
This narrow
unrelated to the correction of the violation in question. '
characterization is synonymous with the scope of injunctive relief "to remedy a
violation" that might be available to either an agency or a court. Such a
restrictive interpretation would eliminate any opportunity for a "supplemental"
project (i.e., SEP) beyond any obligation required by law because a SEP by
definition is a project that is not otherwise required by law. Thus, if EPA may
seek the completion of a project as part of injunctive relief for the violation, it
would not accept such a project as a SEP to settle the case."
The Comptroller General's decisions also prohibit any payment to "an
institution that... would have no relationship to the violation and would not
have suffered any injury from the violation."' 2 This narrow focus limits
payments to compensation for harm done by the violation itself in the form of
damages that a court might award. Thus, under its stringent approach, the

88. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g(1) (2000).
89. 1992 GAO Opinion, supra note 68, at 5 n.2.
90. 1993 GAO Opinion, supra note 68, at *1 (citing 70 Comp. Gen. 17,19).
91. See Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796,

24,799-800 (May 5, 1998).
92. Id.
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Comptroller General would eliminate the possibility of projects beyond
compensation for precise harm done. It would also appear to prohibit payments
to "third parties" (neither the violator nor the enforcing agency or party) to
provide environmentally beneficial services, even if closely related to the violation
or the affected natural resource.
Despite these narrow views, the determinations of the Comptroller General
have not seriously impeded the use of SEPs by EPA. EPA adopted its 1998 SEP
Policy despite the Comptroller General's decisions. 3 The Supreme Court has
questioned the extent of the Comptroller General's authority over executive
agencies. 4 Nor does it appear that the Comptroller General's decisions have
had any serious impact on the use of SEPs in citizen suits. As noted above,
courts have generally entered consent decrees that include SEPs in citizen suits
even over the objection of EPA and the Department of Justice.9 Thus, the
critical view of SEPs taken by the Comptroller General, has had no significant
impact on their use in citizen suits.
5. EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSE TO CITIZEN SUIT SEPs

Government agencies have expressed a range of views regarding SEPs over
the years. Some agencies (e.g., the Comptroller General) have been openly
hostile to SEPs, while others have been skeptical and have kept a watchful eye
(e.g., EPA and the Department ofJustice). In commenting on SEPs included in
consent decree settlements of citizen suits enforcing the federal Clean Water Act,
the Department of Justice and EPA have been critical of many SEPs proposed
in such settlements, even though the same agencies have used SEPs in their
enforcement case settlements for some time. 6 While EPA and DOJ have
occasionally lodged objections to proposed SEPs in citizen suit settlements,
courts have ordinarily entered the proposed consent decrees over the objections
of the executive branch.97 EPA has also adjudicated matters involving the use of
SEPs in its own internal administrative processes. The EPA Environmental
Appeals Board" is the final agency decision-maker on administrative appeals
93. See infra Parts 5.1 and 5.2, discussing the 1998 EPA Penalty Policy.
94. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
95. See, for example, Sierra Cldb, Inc. P. ElectronicControls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1990), discussed supra at notes 17-25 and accompanying text. See also Northwest Envl. Def. Ctr.
v. Unified Sewerage Agency, Civ. No. 88-1128-HO, 1990 WL 191827 (D. Or. July 27, 1990),
discussed supra at notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, Civ. No. CV-773047-HIP (C.D. Cal. 1980);
1980 EPA Penalty Policy, supra note 2; Mann, supra note 2, at 191 n.93.
97. See cases cited supra at 96.
98. The Board was created in 1992 to address the growing importance of EPA adjudicatory
proceedings as a mechanism for implementing and enforcing the environmental laws. See
Environmental Appeals Board, at http://www.epa.gov/eab/ (last modified May 13, 2003). The
Board is composed of up to four members who are independent of all agency offices that are
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EPA's
under all major environmental statutes administered by EPA."
Environmental Appeals Board has held that projects that have been initiated or
completed before a penalty has been assessed for a violation of an environmental
statute cannot be considered SEPs.MJ In reaching its decision the Appeals Board
explained that "SEPs embody legally enforceable commitments to perform future
acts that represent an essential part of the quidpro quo the Agency expects to
receive for settling a case with a reduced penalty.""" Prior projects may,
however, "be legitimately considered [during the penalty phase] under the 'other
factors as justice may require' penalty adjustment factor. '" 2 The Appeals Board
noted that the distinction between SEPs and prior projects that may be
considered in the penalty phase to reduce the penalty as "justice may require" is
not merely rhetorical:
As a matter of policy, the Agency obviously looks favorably upon the
undertaking of a project which benefits the environment and which goes beyond
the requirements of environmental laws. By considering such behavior in a penalty
assessment proceeding the Agency can provide an incentive for companies to
engage in environmentally beneficial activities. Nevertheless, sight must not be lost
of the fact that initial compliance with the law is the primary objective of the
Agency's enforcement efforts and that penalties play an important deterrent role
in those efforts. Therefore, the amount of credit which is allowable for
environmentally beneficial projects must be tempered with the knowledge that a
violation has taken place. Thus, to strike the proper balance between these
conflicting forces, we are of the view that the evidence of environmental good
deeds must be clear and unequivocal, and the circumstances must be such that a
reasonable person would easily agree that not giving some form of credit would be
a manifest injustice.'"
The Appeals Board also found that policy issues dictate that SEPs and any
other future projects to be performed by defendants should only be considered

concerned directly with matters that could be heard by the Board. 40 C.F.R. 1.25(e) (2002). The
Board sits in panels of three and makes decisions by majority vote. Id.The Board's caseload
consists primarily of appeals from permit decisions and civil penalty decisions. See Environmental
Appeals Board, at http://www.epa.gov/eab/ (last modified May 13, 2003).
99. See 40 C.F.R. § 22.1 (2002); 40 C.F.R. § 22.4(a) (2002).
100. Spang & Co., 1995 EPA App. LEXIS 33, at *5-*6 (Oct. 20, 1995). A civil penalty had
been assessed against Spang & Company for violations of section 313 of the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000). Id. Spang argued that ten
environmentally beneficial projects that had been commenced or completed before the penalty
at *6. The
assessment should be considered SEPs and result in a reduction of the civil penalty. Id.
Appeals Board held that these projects could not be considered SEPs under the 1995 SEP Policy.
id
at *54.
101. Id.
102. Id.
at *56.
at *58-*59.
103. Id.
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as part of settlements, not in the penalty assessment phase. The Appeals Board
stated:
There are several compelling policy reasons for rejecting the consideration of
any future projects (including of SEPs) in litigated proceedings. These reasons
stem from the conclusion that administrative adjudications are not well suited to
consideration of future projects. Such adjudications, involving the resolution of
contested issues, including penalty amount, by a neutral third party (the presiding
officer), are not well suited to establishing the acceptability, scope, and terms of a
future project such as a SEP. Further, a promise to perform a future act involves
substantial legal and management problems pertaining to future oversight and
enforcement, including putting additional demands on the Agency's enforcement
resources. Accordingly, we conclude as a matter of policy that presiding officers
should not consider future projects such as SEPs in their penalty determinations.
Such projects should more appropriately be considered in negotiated settlements
among the parties, pursuant to the SEP Policy. "
After years of experience in using SEPs in its own settlements, adjudicating
SEP issues internally, and in commenting on SEPs used by citizens in citizen suit
enforcement cases, in 1998, EPA formally adopted a SEP Policy to guide its use
of SEPs in settling environmental enforcement cases." s EPA uses the SEP
Policy for two purposes: first, it employs the policy to govern its consideration
of SEPs in negotiating and settling government enforcement cases; and second,
EPA and the Department ofJustice use the SEP Policy to guide their comments
to district courts in their adjudication of SEPs proposed in the settlement of
According to the Policy, SEPs are defined as
citizen enforcement suits.'
"environmentally beneficial projects which a defendant/respondent agrees to
of an enforcement action, ,tewie,107
but which the
undertake
in settlement
is no
deedn/rsodn
defendant/respondent is not othenviue lgall requiredtoperform. The EPA's SEP
policy applies to both "civil judicial and administrative enforcement actions"
under "statutes and regulations EPA administers."'0 8 According to EPA, the
policy is for settlement purposes only and is not intended to be used by any party
at a hearing or a trial." 9
Pursuant to the EPA Policy, since SEPs may be included in settlements, any
activities that the defendant is already obligated to perform will not qualify as a
SEP. Thus, these projects must "supplement" the environmental obligations that
statutes, regulations, or permits may already impose upon the defendants. This
"supplementary" requirement is also consistent with the practice that these
104. Spang, 1995 EPA App. LEXIS 33, at *54-*55.
105. SeegeneralbFinal EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg.
24,796, 24,797-98 (May 5, 1998).
106. Id at 24,797.
107. Id. at 24,797-98 (caps omitted).
108. Id at 24,797.

109. Id at 24,797-98.
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projects are used to reduce the civil penalties the defendant would otherwise pay
to the Treasury."" Accordingly, the SEP payment must exceed the costs that the
defendant would otherwise incur in meeting its obligations under environmental
statutes, regulations, or permits.
EPA's SEP Policy is, by its own terms, narrowly drawn to encompass only
projects to be undertaken by defendants or respondents.' When the two parties
negotiating the SEP are the government and the defendant, it is likely the
defendant will undertake the SEP. Indeed, EPA's SEP Guidelines dictate that
EPA cannot manage or administer the SEP. 1 12 Unlike the SEPs in the EPA
Policy that are by definition limited to implementation by defendants, SEPs
proposed in the settlement of citizen suits are more often carried out by third
parties, i.e., entities that are not parties to the litigation. When third parties,
rather than defendants, implement SEPs, a host of concerns that must otherwise
be addressed are avoided." 3 For example, when third parties undertake SEPs,
there is likely no need to examine whether the defendant had a legal obligation
to perform the SEP, since it is unlikely that the defendant had a legal obligation
to pay a third party to carry out an environmentally beneficial project." 4 Where
a third party undertakes the SEP, it is also reasonably easy to determine the actual
cost of the SEP to the defendant, i.e., the amount of the payment to the third
party.
Conversely, when the defendant is the entity that undertakes the SEP, there
is a significant concern that the actual cost of the SEP to the defendant may be
far less than the reported cost of the SEP."5 A defendant undertaking a SEP that
reduces its use or disposal of toxic chemicals may actually benefit from a
reduction in its costs of doing business, an increase in the value of its property,
and other benefits. If the defendant recovers the cost of the SEP as a direct
result of the SEP, especially over a short period of time, the "penalty value" or
deterrent value of the SEP is severely undermined, if not eliminated, by the value
added to the defendant's property or business. A SEP could ultimately pay for
itself in future cost avoidance to the defendant, meaning that the defendant
would have paid no penalty (at least in the SEP portion of the settlement).
In contrast, when a third party implements the SEP, the cost of the SEP to the
defendant normally is paid at or near the time of settlement to a third party and
is not subject to future recovery by the defendant. In this case, there is no added
110. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Project Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,801-02.
111. Id. at 24,797-98.
112. Id. at 24,798.
113. See Dana, supranote 43, at 1216-21.
114. If the defendant had contracted with a third party to undertake an environmentally
beneficial project before the enforcement action was settled, the payment would likely not be
eligible for consideration as a SEP for the reasons stated by the Environmental Appeals Board in
Spang discussed supraat notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
115. See Dana, supranote 43, at 1193-94.
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value or appreciation over time to the defendant. In addition, when a third party
is paid to perform the SEP, the SEP is more likely to be accomplished off-site
and independent of the defendant's operations, e.g., a purchase of open space or
a wetlands restoration. To the extent that the SEP is independent from the
defendant's operations and has no incidental effect on those operations, the
"penalty value" of the SEP is likely to be more certain, and less able to be
reduced by incidental benefits to the defendant. The use of third party SEPs thus
avoids significant concerns recognized by EPA when a defendant implements a
SEP. Nevertheless, EPA has by definition artificially limited the use of SEPs in
its enforcement cases to those implemented by defendants."'

5.1 EPA's SEP Guideines
EPA's 1998 Policy includes five guidelines to ensure that SEPs are within its
authority. The five EPA SEP Guidelines are: (1) The project must be consistent
with all underlying statutes. (2) The "projects must advance.., the objectives of
the environmental statutes that are the basis of the enforcement action and must
have adequate nexus," or "relationship between the violation and the proposed
project." (3) The EPA cannot manage the funds for the SEP or manage or
administer the SEP. (4) The type and scope of the SEP must be defined within
the settlement and cannot be determined at a later time. (5) The SEP cannot
perform either the EPA's or another federal agency's statutory obligations." 7
EPA's SEP guidelines are consistent with case law the courts have developed
for the review of consent decrees in general, and they codify the practice that
both EPA and most citizen enforcement groups have followed in these matters
for over a decade prior to the SEP Policy's adoption. Nothing in the five EPA
SEP Guidelines explicitly limits the implementation of the SEP to the defendant,
and the requirements set forth in the Guidelines can be met with SEPs
implemented by third parties.
5.2 EPA 's SEP Categories
The 1998 EPA SEP Policy also defines seven categories of SEPs that are
acceptable to the government for settlement of its cases. Projects that have
"environmental merit" but do not fit into any category may be accepted if they
are consistent with other provisions of this policy and with approval of the
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance."' The seven EPA SEP
categories are:

116.

Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,797-

98.
117. Id. at 24,798.
118. I at 24,796-801.
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1. Public Health-Public health SEPs provide "diagnostic, preventative
and/or remedial components of human health care.".... The steps taken must be
related to the harm or potential harm the violation caused, and the project must
benefit the population that the violations affected. 2 '
2. Pollution Prevention-Pollution prevention SEPs reduce pollution through
source reduction. These SEPs include technology controls, product redesign,
maintenance improvements, and conservation or efficiency improvements. The
project must actually decrease the pollution released into the environment and
cannot simply transfer the pollution to another media.' 2'
3. Pollution Reduction-Pollution reduction projects address wastes that are
already generated or released. Suitable methods include recycling, treatment, or
improved disposal techniques that decrease the amount or toxicity of
contaminants entering the environment but do not qualify as pollution
prevention projects.4. Environmental Restoration and Protection-These projects enhance the
geographic area or ecosystem that was adversely affected. The projects either
protect from actual or potential damage due to the violation or they improve the
ecosystem's overall condition. Restoration projects can
also repair buildings or
23
facilities, or remove contaminated soils or materials.
5. Assessments and Audits-Assessments and audits can be SEPs if they are
not available as injunctive relief. The three types of projects that can be used are
pollution prevention assessments, environmental quality assessments, and
compliance audits. 4 To qualify as a SEP, the defendant must agree to give the
EPA a copy of the report. Pollution prevention assessments review "specific
processes and operations" to reduce the "use, production, and generation of
toxic and hazardous materials and other wastes."' 25 Environmental quality
assessments investigate environmental site conditions.
"Environmental
compliance audits are independent evaluations of a defendant/respondent's
compliance status with environmental requirements.1 2 6 These audits are usually
only acceptable as SEPs if the defendant is a small business or a small community
with less than 2,500 people.'27
6. Environmental Compliance Promotion-These projects give training or
technical support to members of the regulated community to either achieve
119.
24,799.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,796,
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id

Id. at 24,799-800.
Id at 24,800.
Id
Id at 24,800 n.11.
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compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements or to go beyond
compliance by reducing pollution. They can include seminars that address
widespread violations within the defendant's field.'28
7. Emergency Planning and Preparedness-These projects provide assistance,
often in the form of donated equipment or training, to a state or local emergency
response entity to help them meet the requirements of the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). These SEPs can be used where
the primary impact is within the same area affected by the defendant's violations
and when the EPA has not previously provided assistance for the same proposed
area. The SEP can only involve non-cash assistance and there must have been
either an EPCRA, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and
129
Liability Act (CERCLA) section 103, or CAA section 112(r) violation.
While the projects included in the EPA categories are environmentally
beneficial, many raise some of the concerns discussed above regarding the
implementation of SEPs by defendants rather than by third parties. These
concerns are most pronounced for the pollution prevention and pollution
reduction projects. For example, if a defendant undertakes a pollution
prevention or reduction project as a SEP, the defendant may recover the cost of
the SEP by realizing reduced costs of chemicals, reduced energy costs, or other
cost savings in implementing the SEP. If these cost savings occur, the penalty
value of the SEP may be significantly reduced or eliminated.
5.3 Penalties Under the EPA Poliy
The EPA SEP policy recognizes that penalties are an important part of the
results that must be achieved in an enforcement case. Penalties are important to
settlements because they act as a deterrent to future noncompliance by the
defendant and also act as a general deterrent to other entities subject to the
environmental laws who might be subject to such penalties in the future if they
were to violate those laws. Under the EPA SEP Policy, the cost of the SEP may
be considered as a factor in the settlement amount.13 ()
The EPA SEP Policy sets out five steps to calculate the final penalty in a
settlement that includes a SEP.13' The first step is to calculate the settlement
amount without a SEP.1 2 The second step is to calculate the minimum penalty
128. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Project Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,800.
129. Id.
at 24,800-01.
130. Id.
at 24,801-02.
131. Id
132. Id.at 24,801. This calculation includes calculating the economic benefit of
noncompliance and the gravity component of the penalty without the SEP. The economic benefit
component of the penalty is intended to remove any benefit that the defendant might have gained
by violating the environmental requirement at issue in the case. For example, if the defendant had
violated its permit for one year and the violation could have been remedied by the expenditure of
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with a SEP. 3" The third step is to calculate the cost of the SEP." 4 Step four is
to determine the SEP mitigation percentage and the mitigation amount. 3 The
fifth step is to determine the final settlement penalty. 3 " The SEP mitigation
amount is subtracted from the settlement amount without a SEP.
The EPA has set out a rational approach in crafting the SEP Policy to assure
that the SEP both retains value to the government as a penalty and also realizes
environmental benefits. The practice, however, may not have succeeded in
meeting the goals of the Policy itself. Professor David Dana describes some of
the pitfalls in SEPs that permit defendants to pay for the SEP through savings

derived from the process changes that were approved in the SEP.'-3 Professor
Dana concludes that the use of SEPs may lower the costs to defendants of
violating environmental laws and reduce the deterrent value of enforcement
actions that include SEPs. 131 Implementation of SEPs by tlird parties avoids this
pitfall while maintaining the penalty value and environmental benefit sought in
the EPA SEP Policy. The focus of the EPA SEP Policy on SEPs implemented
solely by defendants also needlessly complicates the analysis of what an
$100,000 in operating cost for that year, the S100,000 would be the economic benefit component
of the penalty. The economic component portion of a penalty is an extremely important issue in
assessing penalties, but a further discussion of this component is beyond the scope of this Article.
The gravity component of the penalty takes into account all factors other than the
economic benefit including, inter afia, the severity of the violations, the number of violations, the
defendants' history of noncompliance, etc. Further discussion of the intricacies of the gravity
component is likewise beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say for purposes of
determining the settlement amount without the SEP, the economic benefit is added to the gravity
component to equal the minimum amount that will settle the case without a SEP. Id.
133. Id This calculation sets a minimum penalty amount that must be assessed over and
above the SEP. According to the EPA Policy, "[t]he minimum penalty amount must equal or
exceed the economic benefit of noncompliance plus 10 percent of the gravity component, or 25
percent of the gravity component only, whichever is greater." Id.
134. Id. at 24,801-02. The after-tax cost of the SEP is the maximum amount the EPA will
consider for penalty mitigation. Profitable projects are usually not accepted as SEPs. SEP cost
usually includes capital costs, one time costs, and annual operation costs. Id.
135. Id at 24,802. First, EPA must determine what it would settle for without the SEP. 'Then
the SEP must be analyzed to see how well it matches the following factors: benefits to the public,
innovativeness, environmental justice, community input, multimedia impacts, and pollution
prevention. The more the SEP meets these factors, the higher the mitigation percentage, which is
in the EPA's discretion but cannot exceed 80% of the SEP cost. There are two exceptions where
the mitigation can exceed 80/6 of the SEP cost if the SEP is of exceptional quality: (1)defendant
is a small business, government entity, or non-profit organization, or (2) the SEP implements
pollution prevention. If the government must spend significant resources to monitor the SEP,
lower mitigation costs are appropriate. "The SEP COST ... is multiplied by the mitigation
percentage... to obtain the SEP mitigation amount." Id
136. Id
137. See Dana, suranote 43, at 1216-21.
138. Id. at 1205-12.
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appropriate SEP might be and how it might be monitored. The costs of a SEP
to the defendant and the cost of monitoring the SEP to EPA would be far more
certain and readily calculable for SEPs carried out by third parties rather than
those implemented by defendants.
6. THE USE OF EPA's SEP POLI(CY BY DOJ AND EPA IN THE IRREVIEW OF
CITIZEN SUIT SETLEMENTS

EPA and DOJ have reviewed consent decrees that include SEPs since 1987
when Congress amended the Clean Water Act to require submissions of consent
decrees to EPA and DOJ before entry by the district court."3' EPA and DOJ
have used the EPA SEP Policy and its precursors (the EPA Penalty Policies) to
guide their review of these decrees. But because EPA's 1998 SEP Policy does
not provide for SEPs to be carried out by third parties, it is ill-suited for the task
of determining whether a citizen suit SEP is acceptable. Citizen suit SEPs,
however, may simplify EPA's analysis by obviating concerns regarding the actual
cost of the SEP to the defendant, and by minimizing concerns regarding whether
the defendant may ultimately recover the cost of the SEP through its reduced
operating costs.
Quite apart from some of the inherent shortcomings of the use of the EPA
SEP Policy in the settlement of enforcement cases brought by EPA discussed
above, the Policy may be of limited use in EPA's and the Department ofJustice's
review of SEPs proposed in citizen suits. At least one district court held the
Policy inadmissible in a hearing on a consent decree."' In reviewing a SEP
proposed in an EPA enforcement case, the district court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in UnitedStatesv.Atofina Cbems., Inc., determined it must review
the SEP as part of the consent decree and use the typical standard of review for
consent decrees: "A consent decree must fairly, adequately, and reasonably
resolve the pending controversy, while remaining consistent with the public
interest." 1 2
EPA alleged that Atofina had violated numerous environmental statutes at six
of its chemical processing facilities in Alabama, Kentucky, Texas, and New
York.'4 3 The parties reached a settlement, and the United States published a
proposed consent decree for public comment for thirty days as required by a
federal regulation.'" The proposed consent decree included (1) injunctive relief
139. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3) (2000).
140. See United States v. Atofina Chems., Inc., No. 01-7087, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5,2002).
141. Id.
142. Id.at *10, (citing Walsh v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983)).
143. Id.
at "1.
144. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2003). That section establishes:
as the policy of the Department of Justice to consent to a proposed judgment
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to remedy Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and RCRA violations; 4 ' (2) a civil
penalty in the amount of $1,900,000 to be paid to the U.S. Treasury;"' and (3) a
Supplemental Environmental Project that would "beautify and remediate a milelong section of the Montlimar Canal, in Mobile, Alabama, at a total cost of
$300,000." 14 1 The canal flows into the Dog River, which in turn flows into
Mobile Bay, which receives pollutants from different waterways from the
company's Axis, Alabama plant. The LeMoyne Community Advisory Panel
(LCAP), a community group allegedly harmed by the company's violations,
objected to the consent decree claiming: "(1) no part of the SEP will be
performed in the LeMoyne Community where Atofina's Axis plan [sic] is located;
(2) no member of LCAP was advised of the proposed SEP while it was being
developed; (3) alternative projects in4LeMoyne County would directly help those
harmed by Atofina's wrongdoing.' "
The district court found the proposed SEP fulfilled the "adequate nexus"
requirement and did "not replicate existing programs, or clearly supplant future
programs,' 149 as required by the EPA's Supplemental Environmental Projects
Policy,"' but it also found that the EPA violated its own policy "of community
notification and participation in project design.'' The district court, however,
granted the Motion for Entry of a Consent Decree, holding that the EPA's
Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy is just that-a policy. The district
court found the "Policy was intended to clarify the EPA's authority to negotiate
SEPs in the response to claims by the General Accounting Office, and the
Department of Justice, [and] that the EPA's use of SEPs exceeded its delegated
authority."'52 The policy states that it is 'not intended for use by EPA,
defendants, respondents, courts or administrative law judges at a hearing or in
tria. '' 'l u The district court also found that, even if it "had the clear authority to
enforce the terms of the EPA policy, it lacks the power to modify the consent
decree by striking the SEP and leaving the rest of the agreement intact. ' 4
in an action to enjoin discharges of pollutants into the environment only after
or on condition that an opportunity is afforded persons (natural or corporate)
who arc not named as parties to the action to comment on the proposed
judgment prior to its entry by the court.
Id The regulation requires a period of at least thirty days for comment.
145. Atofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137, at *6-*7.
146. Id. at *7.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *8-*9.
149. Id. at *18.
150. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24 ,796 (May
5, 1998).
151.
152.
153.
154.

Atfina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137, at *18.
Id. at *14-*15.
Id. at *17 (citing 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,797).

Id.
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The Atqfina court determined that it must review the SEP as part of the
consent decree and use the typical standard of review for consent decrees.
District courts "have discretion either to accept, or to reject, a proposed consent
decree: the court may not modify the settlement into one which it 'considers as
ideal."' 1 5 In addition, the court found that "[i]n the context of environmental
litigation brought by the United States, the court owes "deference... to [the]
EPA's expertise and to the law's policy of encouraging settlement."' 5' In the end,
the district court said it understood "the frustration of the citizens' group in Axis,
Alabama,"' 7 because it may have been "adversely affected by Atofina's violation
of the environmental laws,"' 58 but "[g]iven the choice of rejecting or accepting
the agreement as written,"'' the district court found the consent decree, as a
whole, served the public interest and had to be approved."'
Thus, the EPA SEP Policy is of limited value in addressing the inclusion of
SEPs in consent decrees that may be challenged in court. The Policy itself
provides that it is not binding upon any party or tribunal in a hearing.' It may
carry some persuasive value if it were considered in a dispute regarding a
proposed SEP; however, courts are reluctant to be limited by the policy even
where EPA itself has violated its policy.22 So long as the SEP meets judicially
sanctioned general criteria for approval of a consent decree with a SEP, courts
are likely to approve them. Finally, the EPA SEP Policy does not alter the
general reluctance of courts to approve SEPs even over government objections
so long as the SEPs meet other generally accepted standards for the approval of
settlements.
7. TAX TREATMENT OF SEPs

Whether a payment for a SEP by a violator is deductible for tax purposes can
have a significant impact upon the size of a SEP payment that the violator may
be willing to make."' Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code permits
155. Atofina Chews., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137, at *11 (citing United States v. Cannons
Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1990)). See also United States v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., 235 F.3d 817, 822 (3d Cir. 2000); Officers forJustice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615,
630 (9th Cir. 1982).
156. Atofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137, at * 11 (citing SoutheasternPa. Transp. Auth.,
235 F.3d at 822). See also Cannons Engg Corp., 899 F.2d at 84.
157. Atofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137, at *20.
158. Id
159. ld at*17.
160. Id.
161. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796,
24,797 (May 5, 1998).
162. SeeAtofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137, at *18.
163. See John C. Smith, Comment, Should EntironmentalMonetagySanctions Be Tax Deductible?,
26 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 435 (1999), noting that a $650,000 nondeductible fine is economically
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deductions for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
' 4
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. '""
However, section 162(0 of
the Tax Code prohibits deductions "for any fine or similar penalty paid to a
government for the violation of any law."'65 Thus, whether the payment for a
SEP is a deductible "ordinary and necessary" business expense under the section
162(a) or a "fine or similar penalty" under section 162(f), has a significant impact
on the deterrent value of the payment.
EPA considers whether or not the defendant will deduct the cost of the SEP
for tax purposes when it determines the net SEP cost to the defendant and
decides if it will accept the proposed settlement under its Penalty Policy. 16 1 It
thus recognizes that the tax treatment of SEPs may have a significant impact on
the deterrent value of the SEP payment, but takes no position regarding whether
SEPs are tax deductible.
The two Circuit Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the tax deductibility of
SEP payments have held that a payment for a SEP is not a deductible expense."' 7
In 1989, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that a $1.6 million payment
to the Pennsylvania Clean Air and Clean Water Fund in a settlement of EPA's
allegations of violations of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act were not
deductible under section 162(o of the Internal Revenue Code.'
The appellate
court upheld the Claims Court's ruling that the deduction was barred by section
162(f) because the payment constituted a "fine or similar penalty paid to a
government for the violation of any law."' 9 The appellate court also held that
the penalty was not compensatory. 170 Had the payment been found to be
compensation for the harm done to the environment, the payment may have
been found not to be a penalty and therefore deductible as a business expanse.
In 1995, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the determination
of the Tax Court that an $8 million donation to an endowment fund was not
deductible under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code because the
donation was not voluntary.'
The facts surrounding the "donation" are
equivalent to a $1,000,000 deductible monetary payment that reduces the payer's tax liability by
S350,000.

164. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2000).

165. Id§ 162(o.

166. Final EPA Supplemental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796, 24,802 (May 5,

1998).
167. Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, 880 172d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Allied-Signal, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 63T.C.M. (CCII) 2672 (1992), affd without opinion, 54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995).
168. Colt Industris,880 F.2d at 1314.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH)
2672,1992 WL 67399 (1992), affd
without opinion, 54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995). Petitioner Allied-Signal, Inc. is a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in New Jersey; thus, despite the fact that the underlying events
occurred in Virginia, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided the tax question.
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instructive: In 1976, a grand jury indicted Allied-Signal (hereinafter Allied) on
criminal charges including 940 counts of unlawful discharge of Kepone and other
toxic chemicals. 7 2 In August, 1976, Allied pled nolo contendere as to all 940
counts. 73 The trial judge accepted the plea over the objection of the United
States Attorney."' At the plea hearing, the trial judge expressed his hope that the
criminal fine could be allocated to the Commonwealth of Virginia: "I want to
know if any5 of this fine that will be forthcoming can be allocated to the State of
Virginia.''
In October, 1976 the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding
the sentence to be imposed and sentenced Allied to pay a fine of $13.2 million
for these violations. In imposing the sentence the judge stated that
I hope after this sentence, that every corporate official, every corporate employee
that has any reason to think that pollution is going on, will think, "If I don't do
something about it now, I am apt to be out of a job tomorrow." I want the officials
to be concerned when they see it." '
The judge then reiterated his desire that the fines be used to benefit the people
of Virginia who were harmed by Allied's actions, but concluded that he was
"satisfied ... that this cannot be done under the law.""'7 The trial judge then
ordered that Allied pay the fine within ninety days and indicated that he would
entertain a Rule 35178 motion at the end of ninety days. 7 1 The trial judge further
stated that
Now, so there be no misunderstanding, this is not a suggestion that the Court will
reduce the fines. I intend to and will consider what actions, if any, have been
voluntarily taken by the defendant corporation to alleviate the horrendous effects
that have occurred.
In no event, do I want any actions done under any compulsion whatsoever. Any
action it would take should be taken voluntarily. In no event would a reduction,
if there is a reduction, be in an amount equal to whatever they may voluntarily
expend. I am not, however, closing my mind to consideration of an appropriate
adjustment. l"'
172. Aled-Signal,63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672,1992 WI. 67399 (publication page references are not
available).

173. Id.

174. Id
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as applicable to offenses committed
prior to November 1, 1987, permitted a defendant to move for a reduction of sentence within 120
of the imposition of sentence. See Alied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CC-l) 2672, 1992 WL 67399.
179. Id
180. Id
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Finally, the trial judge stated that the 90-day period was not a probationary period
and that he neither could nor would impose any actions upon Allied as a
condition of probation.'
Between October 1976 and January 1977 attorneys for Allied and the United
States Attorney each met separately on a number of occasions with the trial judge
to discuss the reduction of the penalty.'8 2 In January, 1977, Allied's board of
directors decided to create an endowment to alleviate the effects of Kepone on
the environment and the effect on persons affected by Kepone, to fund it with
$8 million, and to have the endowment board of directors designated by the
sentencing judge." 3 On January 27, 1977, the Allied board acted to establish the
endowment.' On January 28, 1977, Allied filed a motion to reduce the penalty
from $13.24 million to $1.48 million, the minimum provided by law.85 The
United States Attorney opposed the motion claiming that Allied would likely seek
a tax deduction for the payment to the endowment and effectively reduce the
penal and deterrent purpose of the fine.'
The trial court reduced the fine to $5
million on February 1, 1977."87 On February 2, 1977, Allied transferred $8
million to the Endowment.1m
Allied deducted the $8 million transferred to the endowment fund as an
"ordinary and necessary business expense" under section 162(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code.8 9 However, the Commissioner contended that this deduction was
nondeductible as a fine under section 162(f) and disallowed the deduction. 1,") The
issue presented to the Tax Court was whether the $8 million earmarked for the
endowment fund constituted a "fine or similar penalty" under section 162(f).' 9 '
To qualify as a fine under section 162(f), the payment must be both involuntary
and be imposed to punish or deter the payer.1 2 In determining whether the
payment was "voluntary," the court noted that section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code (addressing charitable contributions) defined voluntary payments
as one made without the expectation of a quidpro quo.' The court found that
the endowment payment was clearly made with a "virtual guarantee that the
sentencing judge would reduce the criminal fine by at least that amount" and

181. Aled-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (C-CH) 2672, 1992 WL 67399.
182. Id.

183. Id
184. Id.
185. Id
186. Id.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.

Id
Id
Id
Id.

Id
Id
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therefore qualified as involuntary.'94 Despite some language by the sentencing
judge earmarking the payments for the purpose of compensating the victims, the
Tax Court found that the trial judge primarily intended to "punish petitioner and
to deter both petitioner and other industrial corporations from future
pollution."'' 5 The court also stated that it did "not believe that a Government
must actually 'pocket' the fine or penalty to satisfy the 'paid to a government'
requirement of section 162(o.' ' 6
In summary, the courts have held that payments for SEPs are not deductible
business expenses. Despite these holdings, EPA factors tax deductibility into its
SEP calculations. One concern that may not be addressed is whether there is any
mechanism to prevent a violator who undertakes a SEP as part of a citizen suit
settlement from nonetheless deducting the payment either as a business
deduction or as a charitable contribution. It may be appropriate that when the
Department of Justice reviews citizen suit consent decrees that include SEPs, it
forward information regarding the SEP payment to the IRS so that IRS may
monitor the tax treatment of SEP payment.
8. THERE AiuE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL USE OF

SEPs IN

SETLEMENTS OF CITIZEN SUITS

As noted earlier, to date there has been no comprehensive review of SEPs
adopted in citizen enforcement cases. Indeed, the only collection of such
settlements that exists are those submitted to the EPA and DOJ since the CWA
was amended in 1987.197
In the interest of beginning to catalog the success of various types of SEPs,
set forth below is a series of case studies that describe the enforcement action
and its resolution and comment upon its implementation to date. Where
possible, the SEPs are reviewed in light of the criticisms noted earlier in this
Article.
8. 1 Long IslandSound and JamaicaBay Dissolved Ox.ygen Fund
In 1998, two environmental organizations and a number of individuals
concerned about pollution in the East River andJamaica Bay filed a lawsuit under
the federal CWA in federal district court in the Eastern District of New York
against the City of New York as defendant.' 8 The City operated sewage
treatment plants that discharged wastes into those waters. The complaint alleged
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
1998).

Alied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCI-1) 2672, 1992 WL 67399.
IdM
Id (quoting Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384, 1389 (1987)).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3) (2000).
Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 98 VC 1635 (E.D.N.Y.
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that the plants were violating their State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(SPDES) permits. The State of Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection and the State of New York Department of Environmental
Conservation also intervened as plaintiffs.' "
In 2002, the parties to the case executed a consent order settling the case. The
defendant agreed to come into compliance with all nitrogen baseline limits and
monitoring and nitrogen reporting limits in its SPDES permits for a period of 18
consecutive reporting periods. The settlement also included the creation of a
supplemental environmental project-a Long Island Sound and Jamaica Bay
Dissolved Oxygen Fund into which the defendant deposited $4 million.' °
According to the terms of the agreement, the Long Island Sound and Jamaica
Bay Dissolved Oxygen Fund was to be administered by the Eastern
Environmental Law Center, Inc. (EELC),21" and a committee of the four
plaintiffs and the defendant had to approve distribution of grants from the fund.
The consent decree provided that the funds had to be spent to support land
acquisition projects, habitat restoration, and water quality improvement projects
or for studies benefiting Jamaica Bay or Long Island Sound and that such
spending comply with certain criteria in the consent decree. 2°2 Thus far, funds
from the decree have been granted to non-profit groups to operate sewerage
pump-out boats in Jamaica Bay and Long Island Sound. Other projects will be
funded in the future.
8.2 New Jersey EnvironmentalEndowment
The Environmental Endowment for New Jersey, Inc. was created in 1991 as
part of the settlement of the case Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.
(NJPIRG)v. Powell Dufflyn Terminals Inc. (PDT). 3 discussed previously in Part
Three.' After the Third Circuit struck down an environmental benefits fund
that had been created by the district court after trial on the merits, the parties
settled the case by creating the Endowment with a $900,000 payment from the
defendant. The Endowment Board was comprised of a representative of the
plaintiff, a representative of defendant, and four representatives from NewJersey
environmental groups. Richard Sullivan, who served as the first Commissioner
of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, chaired the
199. Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc.., No. 98 VC 1635.
200. See id (Stipulation of Settlement and Consent Order [hereinafter Soundkeeper Consent
Order]) (on file with author).
201. The Eastern Environmental Law Center (EELC) is a non-profit corporation supporting
legal representation for environmental organizations in the eastern United States. The author is a
founder and director of EELC.
202. Soundkeeper Consent Order, supranote 200.
203. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
204. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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Endowment Board. Projects funded from this consent decree must have a nexus
with the New York Harbor estuary into which PDT had discharged.
The Endowment has continued to be the recipient of other settlement funds
in other Clean Water cases brought by NJPIRG. The Endowment received a $2
million payment from the defendant in the settlement of Pubhc Interest Research
Group v. Witco Chemical Corp.2 "' Subsequently, in 1994 the Endowment received
an additional $2.2 million from the settlement of Pubic Interest Research Group q1'
New JerseY, Inc. v. Circuit Foil USA, Inc.2" Over the years, other citizen suit
settlements led to additional funds being deposited into the Endowment to fund
projects that accomplished environmental improvements to New Jersey's
waterways. Each of the consent decrees required that there be a nexus between
grants from the funds and the waterbodies affected by the discharges in the
case. 2"7 Significantly, the Circuit Foil settlement requires that prior to funding
any environmental projects under that decree, the Endowment must notify the
State of New Jersey, the U.S. Attorney General, and the EPA Administrator in
writing of its plan to fund the particular project. Any of these parties may submit
comments within set periods of time on the project to the Court pursuant to
section 505(c)(3) of the Clean Water Act. Parties are then given time in which to
submit responses to the Court.
If no comments are received by the court within the time period set by the
Consent Order, the Endowment is entitled to fund the project under
consideration. However, should comments be received, the Endowment is not
allowed to fund the project until the court authorizes it to do so. In the eight
years that the Endowment has allocated funds to grantees under this decree, the
State of NewJersey has filed an objection to proposed grants only once. After
reviewing the objection and responses, the court permitted the Endowment to
fund the grants. 2"
The Endowment distributes hundreds of thousands of dollars to
environmental projects in New Jersey each year. It continues to be a source of
beneficial environmental projects.
8.3 The QuinnopiacRiver Fund
The Quinnipiac River Fund was established in 1990 as part of the settlement
of a lawsuit brought by Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and
Connecticut Fund for the Environment (CFE) against The Upjohn Company

205. Civ. No. 89-3146,90-968,1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20209 (D.N.J.June 28,1990) (Consent
Order) (on file with author).
206. Civ. No. 89-5371, 1993 WL 118191 (D.N.J. Apr. 12,1993) (Consent Order) (on file with
author).

207. See Consent Decrees on file with author.
208. Court Order on file with the author.
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(Upjohn). 2 ' In the settlement the parties agreed that Upjohn would make
payments totaling $1,800,000, the majority of which was paid in installments to
the New Haven Foundation (NHF) between 1990 and 1993. The settlement
agreement provides that the principal and net income of the Quinnipiac River
Fund be used to improve the environmental quality of the Quinnipiac River and
New Haven Harbor, the watersheds of these waterbodies, and otherwise to
benefit the environment of these resources.2"' The illustrative, but not exclusive,
listing of acceptable environmental projects provided in the settlement reads as
follows:
1. studying the ecology of those waterbodies;
2. studying pollution of those waterbodies;
3. researching methods of reducing pollution or otherwise improving the
environmental health of those waterbodies;
4. purchasing land in the watersheds of those waterbodies for conservation
purposes and in order to reduce runoff and other pollution into those
waterbodies and to improve public access (physical or visual) to them;
5. providing public education about those waterbodies;
6. environmental advocacy,
except for litigation; and
2
7. habitat restoration. 11
The settlement agreement provided that an Advisory Committee be formed
to advise the directors of NHF about how to distribute the money in the Fund.
The Advisory Committee is to consist of three persons, one selected by the
Board of Trustees of plaintiff CFE, another selected by the Board of Trustees of
plaintiff NRDC, and the third selected jointly by the two Boards. The Advisory
Committee is also empowered to make proposals to the Board of Directors of
NHF regarding distributions from the Fund, including suggestions about
organizations or projects to which distributions from the Fund may be made.
Under the terms of the agreement, NHF established the Quinnipiac River
Fund from the money that it received. The settlement agreement allowed NHF
to commingle money for the Fund with its other assets. However, according to
the terms of the settlement agreement, the principal and net income of the
Quinnipiac River Fund may not be used for purposes of funding administrative
or judicial litigation. 2' 2
8.4 The Tennessee EnvironmentalEndowment
The Tennessee Environmental Council (TEC) filed a CWA citizen suit against
the Dana Corporation, Boston Industrial Products Division (Dana) for
discharges from its facility near Hohenwald, Tennessee. The Hohenwald facility
209.
210.
211.
212.

Natural Res. Def. Council v. Upjohn Co., Civ. No. N85-349 (1). Conn. 1990).
Upjohn Settlement Agreement (on file with author).
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discharges into the Hinson Hollow Branch pursuant
to its National Pollution
213
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.
The parties entered into a consent decree that granted TEC injunctive relief,
instructing Dana to comply with all the terms of its NPDES permit. In addition,
Dana agreed to conduct a Toxicity Reduction Evaluation (TRE) pursuant to EPA
guidelines. To ensure the Hohenwald facility's discharges remain compliant with
the NPDES permit's toxicity limits, Dana agreed to report to TEC and the
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) the sources
of the toxicity in the effluent and recommended remedial measures for
compliance. The decree established a timetable for Dana to improve its facility,
to implement remedial measures, and to show that it completely complies with
the toxicity limits. Furthermore, Dana was required to send a monthly progress
report to TEC to show its compliance. Dana2 1 must also conduct biomonitoring
tests as part of the decree's injunctive relief. 1
In addition to providing injunctive relief, the consent decree contained
reporting obligations. Dana must provide monthly reports containing discharge
and biomonitoring reports, noncompliance reports, and any other documents
related to its NPDES permits. In addition, Dana must give TEC laboratory
analyses of all the monitoring of its discharge.
As part of the settlement, Dana committed to make several payments. Dana
agreed to pay $125,000 to the U.S. Treasury and $1,125,000 to the Tennessee
Environmental Endowment. Dana also would pay stipulated penalties for
noncompliance with the consent decree, exceeding15its effluent limits, and not
following through with its reporting requirements.
9. CONCLUSION
The use of Supplemental Environmental Projects, or SEPs, in the settlement
of citizen suits for enforcement of environmental laws provides an important
means for allowing those areas directly affected by environmental violations to
directly benefit from enforcement actions against polluting parties. Although
SEPs have been used extensively for more than twenty years in government
enforcement actions, in recent years, they have been most widely used to settle
enforcement actions brought by citizens. Unfortunately, objective research,
empirical literature, and comparative literature on the use of SEPs in citizen suits
is sparse. Furthermore, no comprehensive database on the use of SEPs by
citizen plaintiffs exists. This Article has therefore set out to add to the literature
on the topic and to argue for third party implementation of SEPs as a superior
means of enforcement and environmental protection.

213. See Consent Decree on file with author.
214. Id
215. I
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This Article has provided an overview of the use of SEPs in citizen suit
settlements by reviewing the origins of SEPs, tracing the response of the
executive and judicial branches to their usage, and finally profiling several types
of successful SEPs settlements. It has also demonstrated how citizen suit SEPs
undertaken by third parties avoid the drawbacks and conflicts inherent in the
implementation of SEPs by defendants. The Article contends that to preserve
the full deterrent value of SEPs, citizen attorneys should create SEPs
implemented by third parties.
Areas for further research are wide open. The creation of a database on the
use of citizen suit and third-party SEPs, comparable to that of government SEPs,
would be a useful first step.

